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THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL. By Morris R. Cohen. New York: Henry Holt &
Company, 1946. Pp. ix, 497. $3.75.
IN our time, Professor Cohen is one of the few great voices of what used
to be known as Enlightenment-a view of life compounded of Rationalism
and Humanism, of faith in reason and faith in man. He has labored with
passionate enthusiasm to remind us to think, and to trust only the conclu-
sions which we could parse. He has preached the necessity for analyzing
even the most "plausible and self-evident propositions," much to the irrita-
tion of the religious-minded of all sects, and he has himself given classic ex-
amples of how such analysis should be accomplished.
But Professor Cohen is a moralist, too. He is not interested in logic as a
thinking machine, and he has none of the naive and cocksure optimism of
science in the generation of Bazarov. Always conscious of the dependence
of thought upon ignorance, prejudice and values, he is in no sense ashamed
of believing in the Rights of Man, and in his Duties, too.
The pursuit of truth requires freedom. And so does the pursuit of life,
"as the condition or opportunity for the good life." The liberal knows he
has no monopoly of truth; he knows, indeed, that he hasn't found it, even
when he's done his best. Believing in truth, he therefore favors freedom for
others to seek it also. He supports the fullest freedom and diversity in ways
of living as well as ways of thinking. "The aim of liberalism," Professor
Cohen writes in his strong and somber epilogue, The Future of American
Liberalism, "is to liberate the energies of human nature by the free and
fearless use of reason. . . . Liberalism in general thus means the opening up
of opportunities in all fields of human endeavor, together with an emphasis
on the value of deliberative rather than arbitrary forces in the governance of
practical affairs." 1 Humane or liberal civilization is one of individual di-
versity, not uniformity; of free expression rather than censorship; of toler-
ance, not fanaticism. The free society is one of dispersed and not of concen-
trated power. The free personality has a functional rather than a deferential
or dependent attitude towards authority. His constant effort is to keep
power over others to a social minimum, not to seek its expansion for its own
sake, or as a source of cheap security. Professor Cohen's overriding aim is
not only to perfect our understanding of the uses and abuses of the scientific
method, but to demonstrate that science can exist only in a free society, and
that humane civilization is the full and necessary goal of the disinterested
pursuit of truth.
The Faith of a Liberal is a selection of Mr. Cohen's more popular essays
on many subjects, from different periods of his life. They illustrate the unity
1. P. 439.
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and vigor, as well as the distinction, of his outlook. There is throughout a
characteristically equal emphasis on reason and nature, and a characteristic
zeal in dealing with problems of life as well as of philosophy. The uncom-
promising quality of some of his reviews is tempered by the warmth, humor
and affirnation which run through the collection as a whole. The papers are
a pleasure to read. Mr. Cohen writes without pretense, and with conversa-
tional ease. Yet every essay has its argument, plainly visible, to be weighed
on its merits, and enjoyed for its skill and sophistication, even when one's
conclusion is to disagree. Not since Keynes' Essays in Persuasion and Essays
in Biography has there been so rich a collection of occasional papers.
One striking thing about Mr. Cohen's essays is their range. Apart from
his more strictly professional papers, published as A Preface to Logic and
Law and the Social Order, there are 51 items in The Faith of a Liberal, divided
into '11 chapters and an epilogue. There are chapters on Education, Law
and Justice, Science and Mythology, Politico-Economic issues, and indi-
vidual papers on Baseball as a National Religion, the Sacco-Vanzetti case,
Zionism, Erasmus and Luther, and Napoleon. On many of these topics.
naturally, Mr. Cohen has the inestimable advantages of the amateur: the
fresh, well-trained mind, the freedom from traditional limitations and per-
spectives, the ability to raise fundamental questions which professionals in
the field have long since forgotten to consider. Sometimes he makes the
amateur's mistakes; this reviewer, for example, finds Mr. Cohen's economics
deplorably pietistic, in the tradition of Fabian socialism. But there is every-
where vitality, enthusiasm, and the useful thrust of an enquiring mind,
writing against the background of a mature and fully realized point of view.
Perhaps the most general trait these papers have in common is their
strong sense that history is the matrix of everything, the vital key to under-
standing human attitudes and social problems. Mr. Cohen's sense of history
is a broad one. It includes men, ideas and techniques, as well as battles and
business; Jenner and Cartwright as well as Holmes, Spinoza and Napoleon.
It is intellectual history only in that he distills experience intd general forms,
not that he overvalues the force of ideas as such in history. In 1923, he
wrote a piece on "the insistently violent notes of Russian life," and "the
marked weakness, if not the absence [in Russian life] of the spirit of toler-
ance, moderation and compromise which goes to make up our traditional
liberalism." 2 It is an admirably balanced insight, of special interest at the
moment in view of the amount of compromising with the Russians which
our public business requires. His several papers on American history and
American culture have an altogether remarkable force, quality and pene-
tration. They are directed with great economy to ultimate issues, and
together comprise an essay on American civilization of absorbing interest,
and considerable hope.
The papers on law in this volume fairly represent the important work with
2. P. 261.
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which Professor Cohen has for some years enlarged the horizons of the pro-
fessional literature of public law. There are three essays on judges-Holmes,
Brandeis and Cardozo, a substantial article on Constitutional and Natural
Rights in x789 and Since, shorter comments on the cases of Sacco ai A Van-
zetti, and of Bertrand Russell, and a famous review of Professor Arnold's
Symbols- of Government.
The article on Constitutional and Natural Rights, published in 1938, is
something of a paradox in the general body of Professor Cohen's thought
for its emphasis on logic rather than history. It is a full dress attack on the
historical legitimacy of the American practice of judicial review. Mr. Cohen
is indignant at Marshall's tricky reasoning in Marbury v. Madison, ruthless
in disposing of the common constitutional myths, and vigorously the demo-
crat in preaching reliance on the legislature rather than the courts for social
advance and the protection of human rights. Yet Professor Cohen's in-
tellectual pleasure in the argument runs away with him. It does not dispose
of a century and a half of judicial supremacy to prove that it rests on error.
Erroneous or not, judicial review is a functioning part of the machinery of
our society, and cannot be destroyed by a brilliant demonstration of incon-
sistency. The intellectual evolution of our present Supreme Court justices
since their elevation to the Court is an interesting case in point, Many of
them were (and are) outspoken critics of judicial review in general, and
particularly of judicial supremacy as practised during the consulships of
White, Taft, and the early years of Hughes. The pressure of history, how-
ever, has been too much for all of them. Despite elaborate evasions to con-
ceal the unpalatable fact, they have all agreed to the exercise of their tradi-
tional powers. The institution of judicial review has changed its direction,
but not its character. It is stronger than its claim to legitimacy.
All in all, The Faith of a Liberal is a testament of works. If in the end
Professor Cohen's liberalism has less glamor than the dogmas and systems
of more scholastic philosophers, it is because he cannot abide false gods, nor
"the petty oiritments by which quacks pretend to cure the mortal ills of
finitude." 3 There is nothing easy or comfortable about his outlook, despite
its passion for individual and social justice. It is hardly his purpose, how-
ever, to make things easy, or certain, or consoling. "[ihe main function of
teaching philosophy," he said of his own experience as a teacher, "should be
the opening of the human mind to new possibilities, rather than the inculca-
tion of any new set of doctrines. . . . This in practice amounted to aban-
doning the traditional attempt to teach philosophy as a self-sufficient body
of learning, and instead attempting to teach future scientists, lawyers,
economists, and citizens to think philosophically about the problems of
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LAW TRAINING IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE: ITS PRINCIPLES AND PuBLIc
FUNCTION. By Eric F. Schweinburg, with Preface by Esther Lucile
BroVj. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1945. Pp. 129. $1.00.
TnE deprecating descriptions and varied cross-criticisms addressed to
American legal education in the course of recurring discussions on the sub-
ject, may have created an atmosphere of pessimism in regard to its future
prospects. But without minimizing the difficulties of the matter, it should
be recognized that such constant re-examination by the law teachers of their
own purposes and function helps to create a forward tension, a leaning out
toward further action, that insures to a considerable extent the steady
progress of legal education in this country.
The process of discussion just referred to has not lacked, in the past, the
contributions of persons versed in the European methods of law training.
And the usefulness of these descriptions of the French and German experi-
ences can be conceded since in legal education, as in many other fields of
human endeavor, it is often valuable to step outside the circle of customary
observation and come into contact with other forms of experience. Then,
with a new perspective acquired from the outside, the familiar ways appear
with strange relief and unexpected significance.
Esther Lucile Brown, Director of the Department of Studies in the Pro-
fessions of the Russell Sage Foundation, does not exaggerate any claims for
Mr. Schweinburg's survey when she says in the preface that in continental
law training "there must be ideas new to us that would have great potential
usefulness for the re-evaluation of our educational system." 1 The structure,
the aims and traditions, the good points and shortcomings of legal education
in the European countries covered by this study are presented with thor-
oughness and candor. They invite at almost every step the reader's critical
return to his own surroundings with a keener insight and appreciation of
what constitutes their essence.
Differences between the local and the foreign are apt to be striking, but
they are far less interesting than the reasons for which they exist. Once the
question is opened on that level, the problem becomes one of distinguishing
the peculiarities which are consequential to the spirit or the institutions of a
nation, from those which are accidental in their origin and might therefore
have taken some other form. Mr. Schweinburg's survey of continental legal
education raises this kind of question in regard to the function of law schools.
In the United States, he writes, their incentive "was plainly the need for
better trained men at the bar. . . . [Law] schools, set up on private initia-
tive and with private means, looked toward the requirements of private
litigation and counseling. Method of instruction and courses offered were
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he characterizes as founded under official auspices, rather closely controlled
by the government and oriented both toward scholarly endeavors and the
training of men for public life. The carefully proportioned picture which the
author gives of the development of these aims through the activities of con-
tinental law schools could not be compressed into a paragraph of this re-
view without serious distortion. But perhaps it is enough to say that in most
European institutions the law course is meant solely to provide a solid cul-
tural foundation for the subsequent activities of the individual. His pro-
fessional training is a separate and subsequent phase of his preparation for
the bar, the bench, or public administration. Mr. Schweinburg makes it
clear that in opening up the fields of law, political science, economics and
philosophy to its students, the continental law school "strives for a sys-
tematic, genetic and thus scientific presentation of the totality of legal
science, with no other proximate objective." I His later explanations qualify
this statement somewhat, but the essential idea remains.
It may be appropriate to note, in passing, that this attitude of the Euro-
pean law school towards its subject-matter is to be found in almost the same
degree in the new setting of the Western Hemisphere. The Latin-American
law schools have sought to obtain a great part of their contemporary in-
spiration from European models. This is one illustration of the many intense
cultural currents which ran from some European countries, particularly
France and Germany, towards the former Iberian colonies, at a time when
these were gathering the materials for their basic educational institutions,
Although erected upon .the rather bare ground left by the incidents of politi-
cal stabilization and by the cultural revulsion against the ex-oppressors, the
mother countries, the Latin-American law schools in their modern form re-
tained, nevertheless, the nature of their function in the scheme of things to
which they belonged. There is probably no parallel in the English colonies
of America for the role which law schools played in the colonial tradition of
the Hispanic nations. This function was substantially identical to that
which Mr. Schweinburg describes in connection with the European institu-
tions, namely, providing the cultural background and the general qualifica-
tions for public life. In this role, the importance of the colonial university
law schools in Spanish-America was heightened by the fact that outside of
private business, or the military service, the opportunities for a career open
to the men of that time were largely confined by the existing university
facilities to the clergy or to the law. And, whether in response to the de-
mands for a lay, humanistic education, unavailable elsewhere in Spanish-
America, or in keeping with the general trend of European law training, the
colonial law school came to represent the best chance for obtaining both the
social prestige and the all-around intellectual ability which made a public
career possible. For this reason, the professional character of the Spanish-
American law school appears just as de-emphasized as in the case of the
3. P. 10. Author's italics.
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institutions on the continent. Thus, in common with the educational models
they adopted, the Spanish-American law schools, significantly titled "Schools
of Law and Social Sciences," have a tradition of academic comprehensive-
ness and of contact with public affairs which accounts to a great extent for
the success of their graduates in private practice, in politics, or in the civil
administration or the magistracy, without prejudice perhaps to their ac-
tivities in the fields of writing or teaching.
But not all the Spanish-American countries have brought into their
scheme of legal education an element of professional training after law
studies are completed. The absence of this element in Argentina, 4 for in-
stance, makes it compare more closely with the United States than with the
countries of which Mr. Schweinburg presents a detailed picture. Austria 5
and Germany, and with some differences, France 6 and Russia, have devel-
oped an extended process of professional apprenticeship under close govern-
ment supervision. For varying periods of time (as long as seven years in
Austria) the graduates of law schools come into direct contact with, and
effectively participate in the workings of, judicial tribunals, administrative
agencies and law offices before they are allowed to complete the series of
official tests which finally qualify them for positions in the government or
judiciary, or for active practice at the bar.
The author contrasts the "non-professional course of study in the law
department of a university" with the professional apprenticeship training
which follows it, and emphasizes the latter in his survey. This is one of the
great merits of his work, for it is now possible for English-speaking law men
to "see continental legal education in full, whereas previously the available
literature focused on "the theoretical, preparatory foundation afforded by
the university, ... [making it appear] as if theoretical study exhausted the
range of the training or as if the unmentioned second part were of subordi-
nate importance." 7
Although a worthy and welcome addition to the fund of information upon
which American educators may now draw in their planning, this aspect of
Mr. Schweinburg's survey invites less comment because there is nothing in
the United States which could be directly compared with the apprenticeship
training required of continental law graduates. The author's analysis of
4. In Argentina, lawyers are allowed to enter the profession solely upon the strength
of their official diploma, only the formality of registration vith the Federal or Provincial
courts being required. No attempt to train judges for their specific task appears to have
been made outside of the practice of appointing magistrates from among judicial func-
tionaries with lawyers' degrees who have acquired experience over long years of progrezzion
along the hierarchy of positions in the court system. Lacking the "outside help" of appren-
ticeship training, the Argentine law schools have had to answer both cultural and vozational
aims, balancing in a rather uneasy compromise the exigencies of legal scholarkship with the
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European university organization and activity, on the other hand, contains
many provocative passages. In his general presentation of continental law
training, which precedes the description of individual national systems,
Mr. Schweinburg devotes a special section to the secondary school structure
in the European "gymnasium" or "lyc~e." In this connection, he emphasizes
the point that "the characteristics of the first portion of continental law
training, namely, its being theoretical, systematic, and unbridled by prac-
tical purpose, are intrinsically linked to the specific kind of education offered
by the gymnasium, the lyce, or the liceo. Without the kind of instruction
given in these secondary schools the above-mentioned features of the uni-
versity study are hardly possible ... ." 8
This statement effectively underscores the well-known fact that educa-
tional problems on the university level can not be dealt with unless reference
is made to the objectives and accomplishments of the secondary school sys-
tem which serves as its basis. This is particularly true where advanced
studies (law in this case) follow immediately upon completion of the secon-
dary school course (both in European and in Latin-American countries, at
an average age of 18) without an intervening Liberal Arts course such as
colleges in the United States provide. Some of the comparisons which Mr.
Schweinburg draws between the graduate of a European secondary institu-
tion and the American college student may run the risks of generalization,
but they serve to emphasize the comprehensiveness and systematic purpose
of the material covered by the compulsory curriculum of the continental
secondary school. It is to be further noted that due to the complete control
of the national government over secondary education, the acquisition of the
degree or certificate required for admission to the university signifies com-
pliance with a prescribed course of study which is uniform throughout the
country. Discounting personal factors, the law training offered at the
European university can then proceed on the assumption of a basically
identical intellectual background in all the student body.
Mr. Schweinburg points out further the implications of the issue of
"academic freedom" which in Europe, as in Latin-America, has been raised
both to define the relationship of the university, as an institution, to the
respective national government, and to protect the students' traditional
immunity against any compulsion to participate in most of the classroom
activities. Within this system the position of the student differs very much
from that of his American colleague, whose residential attachment to the
university and closely integrated activities on a "campus," are always very
much noticed by the foreign visitor.
Lacking any persistent association between professors and their students,
life in the European law school is based on public lectures and formal exami-
nations. The author complains of the excessive importance attached to the




criterion of performance, it is hard to see how examinations could fail to as-
sume such dominance. The student must necessarily orient his activities
towards these tests and he therefore resorts to whatever practical means are
at his disposal to insure a satisfactory result. This is the origin of the "repeti-
teurs" or private tutors, who with their coaching courses seem to have given
European law schools some of their gravest anxieties.
Granted that the combination of lectures and examinations does not lead
to a satisfactory adjustment of relations between professors and students,
0
and may even be responsible in a large measure for the inflexibility of struc-
ture and content which law courses tend to show over long terms of years,
I think it is clear that the continental fashion for lectures is far more than a
convenience to. the faculty (the members of which are practically never on a
full-time status) or a concession to the student body. The point of de-
parture and the material for most of the law courses of the continental type
is given by the different Codes. From the exegetical point of view that
generally prevails, the coverage of a course becomes co-extensive with the
respective Code and its successive amendments. This means that a whole
field of human relations is approached systematically by means of subdivi-
sions founded upon a logical differentiation of various legal institutions and
of the norms which govern them; the study then proceeds through a deduc-
tive breakdown of the definitions and rules given by the Code, with a correla-
tion of confficting or harmonizing provisions and an analysis of those provi-
sions in the light of their historical background in local or foreign law. In
this task of exposition, the clarity of concept and the persuasiveness of argu-
ment demonstrated by the professor in the development of his lecture stand
ahead of any inquiry into the state of court decisions on the particular point,
which seldom enter into the matter except at a highly doctrinal level: the
absence of any relation of the issues to concrete fact situations as presented
by litigated cases, coincides with an utter lack of discussion of the material
between the instructor and the class, since obviously such dialogues would
simply interfere with the statement of the professor's views, which the stu-
dents tend to concentrate upon to the exclusion of any strong critical pre-
occupation.
As any traveler is likely to be struck by the unusual or the picturesque
9. P. 24. Nothing like that has appeared in Argentina as yet; the complaints of pro-
fessors are directed instead to more or less commercial editions of their previous lectures
(taken down in shorthand by consistent students and embellished with footnote references
to classical treatises) which under the generic name of "apuntes" effectively fill the place of
"cram courses." Such compilations, also known on the continent, have at least this to say
for themselves,-that they cover the whole subject, while the professor seldom do2s so in
his lectures. Hours of class per week are two or three for each subject in Argentina, and
about the same in France. Compare the Austrian schedule, p. 72.
10. P. 50. Seminars and exercise classes have been instituted both to alleviate this
deficiency and to supply occasion for intensive research; see, for instance, in Austria, p. 46;
in Germany, p. 93. But this development has not, in Mr. Schweinburg's opinion, influenced
legal education as a whole to any great extent.
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of foreigfi panoramas, the reporter of developments in legal education
abroad tends to cbncentrate on the peculiarities of other systems. The
differences which rise from any comparison are, however, suggestive of
actual or possible trends, not so much toward cancellation of diversities, as
toward their fusion in a higher synthesis. This may be too ambitious a vision
when the interchange of educational experience between the American and
the Continental spheres of influence is still so meager. But there are already
some indications of a converging process of evolution.
In Europe, for instance, law schools acquired their characteristics under
the eyes of monarchs, particularly of the "enlightened-despot" type, who
wished them to train able administrators for public service. The contem-
porary development of these institutions seems to have tempered this
characteristic-except perhaps in the German schools of the Nazi period-
with the affirmation of a disinterested academic aim: legal scholarship for
its own sake. At the same time, they remain government institutions,
charged with the intellectual formation of a substantial class which even-
tually goes into public life.
In the United States, the private universities have set the tone of educa-
tional endeavor. And yet, without loss of their characteristic independence
vis a vis the government, those which most nearly approximate national
stature have evidenced a growing sense of responsibility in regard to public
affairs. Their law schools have developed from academies for the training
of future members of the bar into university departments with an academic
standing fully as high as those of any graduate division, and even while they
continue to emphasize their professional goals, they show the increasing
recognition which disinterested intellectual work is gaining in the legal field.
This circumstance is not the only one that seems to be bringing American
and Continental methods of legal training closer together. A reading of Mr.
Schweinburg's work suggests many ways in which the experience of Euro-
pean countries may be relevant to the purposes of improvement and reform
in the United States. Without attempting anything more than the state-
ment of a personal impression, I would like to point out three factors whose
combined gravitation upon American legal education seems to influence it in
approximately the same direction as that followed by the Cofttinental de-
velopment.
In the first place, if it be proper to assume that the university law schools
in this country typify the main trends, one may observe that they tend to
withdraw, little by little, from the specific function of preparing candidates
for the state bar examinations, and to leave the bulk of that task to the
special courses organized for the purpose. In addition there is a growing
practice by large law firms of employing recent graduates in a capacity
rather closely similar to that of the French stagiaire," although this develop-




prescribed scheme of apprenticeship training which several European coun-
tries possess. But in any event, both factors shift at least some of the burden
of professional training to a time and a place beyond the limits of the regular
law course, thus approximating in some measure the "two-pronged" design
of Austrian and German education.
In the second place, the American law schools have become increasingly
aware of the public life which their graduates are bound to experience to
some degree, whether they concentrate on private practice, choose the posi-
tions offered them by any of the three branches of government, or enter that
professional penumbra between the two, wherein move the counsel for civic
organizations, the arbitrator, the representative of business groups before
legislative bodies, and the public relations expert. Legal education alone
can bring young men and women into direct contact with the problems of
the human being in society, and at the same time furnish them the instru-
ments which can be used least imperfectly to deal with those problems. The
American law schools are consequently beginning to realize their own poten-
tialities in a task which does not differ very much from that undertaken by
European law schools in the past. From such an awareness there may easily
spring a realization that, whatever the capacity in which he acts, the lawyer
cannot expect to fulfill his mission in contemporary society without that
understanding of his own historical circumstance, that comprehensive set of
ethical and intellectual insights, in substance that culture which only legal
education on a university level can provide.
And if in the discharge of their public responsibility, the American law
schools were to implement this approach by broadening their curricula to
the extent necessary for the better integration of economic and political
science with the appropriate fields of private and public law,1- they should
find help in a third factor. The teaching of law in the leading schools of the
United States is taking account of those "non-legal" materials to approxi-
mately the same extent as the "legal" courses become further relieved of the
excess bulk which they tended to accumulate in the expansion of the case
method. The instinct of self-preservation may have influenced the law
faculties in their attitude towards the overwhelming proliferation of judicial
opinions over the past generation, so that today there is less of an attempt
of laying down "the law" through a sequence of cases, and more of a desire to
select from such raw materials those which can help the student to grasp the
context of human activities to which rules of law apply, and can illustrate
the considerations which play upon the course of decision. This shift of
emphasis away from the normative element of case material seems to make
room for an increasingly broad development of legal science in the field of
law teaching. As the "national" schools have to deal more and more with
12. In Mr. Schweinburg's opinion, Austrian law schools have failed to achieve this
integration due to the disconnected manner in which the disciplines of the social sciences are
placed in the curriculum. See p. 43. Cf. the French results, at p. 7 2 .
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law as a phenomenon transcending the limitations of the positive norms
(statutory or judicial) which control in a particular jurisdiction, other
aspects come to the fore: the search for historical trends, for contrasts of
judicial attitudes and reasoning, the systematization of materials in the
light of whatever "approach" may be dominant. This emergence of a
scientific over a purely expositive trend in law teaching is what I believe
can be detected in the state of American legal education at the present time,
and can be set down as one of the most encouraging promises which the law
schools of the United States can offer to the western community of nations.
Moving as it does in the peculiar intellectual climate of case law, the Amer-
ican law course has the advantages which Mr. Schweinburg probably had in
mind when he pointed out the limitations imposed by legal positivism upon
the continental method of instruction. He says:
"Inquiry moves continually within the realm of legal prescrip-
tions and concepts, without reaching down into the soil of living
facts upon which these prescriptions and concepts rest. It moves
as if roaming the legal province were an ultimate purpose, and law
an end in itself. The student's attention is hardly ever, and cer-
tainly not nearly enough, turned upon the social function of law
and upon its merits or demerits in molding life or even keeping
abreast of it." 13
It seems so unlikely that American legal science, as developed and ex-
pounded in university classrooms should run into this kind of difficulty, that
one may hope confidently for its steady growth over the next generation or
so; certainly, it has gathered enough potentialities to travel well beyond the
beaten paths.
But all this meditation on the prospects of the American law school may
be nothing more than a one-sided commentary on Mr. Schweinburg's work.
Perhaps readers less contaminated than this reviewer by the pervasive in-
fluence of the academic atmosphere may discern in the elaborate European
schemes of apprenticeship training for future barristers, magistrates and
public administrators, the principles and the methods which ought to be
studied and reformulated in the light of American conditions, with a view to
facilitating the development of the practical skills which the university law
school is unable to impart. The most valuable and suggestive part of Mr.
Schweinburg's survey may be his detailed explanation of apprenticeship
training in the European law field, both because of the actual experience it
discloses and of the possibilities of adaptation to which it may give rise. If
such is the case, it may be asked, by way of a closing remark: Might it not
be worthwhile to consider a comprehensive chronological change in the
organization of legal studies in the United States, i.e., shortening the pre-




internship" in law offices, courts and government departments, following a
law and social sciences curriculum of four or more years, in which the allied
disciplines could be given the specific direction and purpose required by
legal education?
JORGE ROBERTO HAYzust
BiRNEis: A FREE MAN's LnE. By Alpheus Thomas Mason. New York:
The Viking Press, 1946. Pp. 644. $5.00.
TIs is an inspiring and timely book. It is inspiring in its picture of how
Brandeis used his extraordinary talents to produce the maximum in personal
self-fulfillment and in public good, in its portrayal of what Justice Holmes
called "the high way in which he always has taken life." 1 It is timely as a
story of unwavering faith in the worth of struggle and in the certainty of
ultimate success. 4
Neither bitter personal attack nor temporary defeat could shake Brandeis'
faith in the future, provided men would continue the fight. Many men have
had this spirit in their youth. But Brandeis' faith and courage remained un-
dimmed until the end. They shone forth in his dissenting opinions of the
1920's, dissents filled with "the glow and fire of a faith that was content to
bide its hour." 2 These traits extended to matters largely beyond his power
to influence. Professor Mason tells that "In the dark days of 1933 when it
seemed that the very depths of depression had been reached, a visitor in-
quired whether he believed the worst was over. 'Yes,' he replied cheerfully,
'the worst happened before 1929'." 3 Even in the last year of the Justice's
life, when the Nazi tide threatened Palestine, to which he had given much
of his spirit as well as his substance, there was no hint of discouragement.
"This is the time to stand firm and resolute," he is quoted as saying. "As-
suming that the Germans will do their worst, invade and destroy and obliter-
ate part of what we have created, they cannot destroy Jewish ideals and
aspirations with regard to Palestine." 4
Faith there was, and a "sense of personal, inner security, which gave one
a greater sense of poise and sure balance than one probably had ever gotten
from another man." 5 But Brandeis was no philosopher in an ivory tower.
In 1890 his former partner, Warren, sent him a selection from The Bacczae
tAbogado, Universidad de Buenos Aires; LL.B., Yale University; formerly, Sterling
Fellow with rank of Instructor, Yale Law School.
1. P. 614.
2. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITEIUTURE (1931) 36.
3. P. 602.
4. P. 636.
5. Memorandum of Willard Aurst, quoted at p. 643.
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concluding with the line "Go forth, my son, and help." 0 Brandeis answered
that call not merely with faith and good will but with specific solutions and
an amazing freedom from doubt as to their validity.
Early in his career he formulated the principles which, without substantial
change, he was to advocate throughout his life-freedom for the individual,
the right to privacy, the desirability of small rather than large units, the
value of an informed competition with scope for reasonable business prac-
tices, a union shop but not a closed shop, regularity of employment, and the
high trusteeship required in the use of Other People's Money. These tenets,
which he preached on any and all occasions, were the basis of his social
philosophy and, in his firm conviction, constituted specifics for the evils of
our time.
Professor Mason's book is largely the story of how Brandeis labored to
have these tenets, so evident to himself, accepted by others. The book
properly places emphasis on Brandeis the lawyer rather than on Brandeis
the judge. This is not because Brandeis was not a great judge. It is rather
that Brandeis was primarily the advocate in everything that he did, includ-
ing his work on the bench. He~made no pretense, at least in the great consti-
tutional controversies, of keeping his mind in balance until the last word of
argument had been said. He had a definite point of view, and he conceived
it his task to make this prevail by every proper means. His approach to
every problem was the approach of the lawyer handling great causes-
ferret out the facts, formulate a position, assess its elements of strength,
marshal the considerations in its support, attack the opposition at its weak-
est point, and pursue that attack until victory was achieved. These were
the elements of the lhwyer's craft which Brandeis employed, first for his
clients, then as "People's Attorney," and ultimately as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court.
Looking backward at eighty-four, Brandeis told his niece, "I think the
fifties are the best." 7 The breadth of his activities, particularly during those
years of his life, literally passes understanding. Take, for example, the
period 1910 to 1913. During Christmas week of 1909 Brandeis had been
retained to act for Glavis in the controversy over the latter's dismissal from
the Interior Department by Ballinger and the allegedly libelous article
which Glavis had written in COLLIER'S. Hearings before a Congressional
investigating committee were practically continuous from late January until
the end of May. On July 24 he was called to New York to attempt to settle
the garment workers' strike. This took much of his time until September
when the "protocol" was signed. Shortly thereafter he was chosen as the
first impartial chairman under this agreement-a post in which he served
for several years. In August he had accepted a retainer from the Boston





the railroads' witnesses appeared before the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and were cross-examined by Brandeis began on August 15, adjourned
in late September, and resumed on October 12. By this time Brandeis was
ready with his own affirmative case-scientfic management and what it
would do to improve railroad efficiency and reduce costs. The hearings lasted
through November, briefs were filed just after the turn of the year, and
Brandeis argued the case in January, 1911. No sooner was his argument
before the Interstate Commerce Commission concluded than he was off to
New Hampshire to conduct an investigation of certain freight rates proposed
by the Boston & Maine Railroad. This period also included his opposition
to a bill introduced in the Massachusetts General Court providing for leases
of new tunnels and subways, further activities in connection with the In-
terior Department and Alaska land grants, the early stages of the United
Shoe 2achinery case, and advocacy of the so-called La Follette-Stanley Bill,
the legislative precursor of the Clayton Act. During 1912 and 1913 the
United Shoe Machinery battle continued and Brandeis' fight against the
management of the New Haven Railroad came to a successful conclusion.
The year 1912 marked the beginning of Brandeis' interest in Zionism to
which, from that time forward, he gave a great amount of time. During
1912 also he made two political speaking tours, first for La Follette's candi-
dacy for the Progressive nomination for the presidency, and, after this fell to
Roosevelt, in support of Woodrow Wilson. After the new executive came in-
to office in March, 1913, Brandeis was constantly consulted by the adminis-
tration on economic measures such as the Federal Reserve Act and the
Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Early in 1913, the railroads
again sought rate increases. In August, Brandeis accepted the Interstate
Commerce Commission's request that he insure that "all sides and angles of
the case are presented," and the hearings began on December 1. The first
article in Other People's Money was published in November, 1913. Yet
throughout this period Brandeis was the head of a highly successful law office
from which he derived a professional income reaching a peak of $105,758
in 1912 8- with very little of this coming from'any of the causes mentioned.
For as "People's Attorney" he neither sought nor would accept remuneration.
It is hard to understand how a man could do all this, even in a perfunctory
fashion. It is still harder to understand how a man could discharge so many
responsibilities in the way that Brandeis did. In whatever cause he was
engaged, he gave himself fully. His concern for the facts was prodigious-
not merely the facts at the center but those on the periphery which might
reflect a light not suspected by other men. Brandeis was at the opposite
pole from the barrister who picks up a brief and educates himself while the
cause is in progress. Nor, so far as Professor Mason's book reveals, did
Brandeis "organize" for the great causes which he handled as is done in
large law offices today. It is true that there were many matters, including
8. P. 691.
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in the latter years most of the ordinary work of his law office, which he
turned over entirely to others. But the cases in which he was personally
active he seems to have handled very largely on his own.
Professor Mason explains "how he did it" on the basis that Brandeis
"applied scientific management to his own life and work." 9 This, of course,
is only part of the story. He had an amazing memory, one which had en-
abled him to achieve the most brilliant record ever made at the Harvard
Law School in spite of the necessity of having to husband his eyes,10 and
which in his years on the bench would permit him to quote accurately figures
as to barge traffic on the Ohio River or boot and shoe production in Mass-
achusetts with which he had not been concerned for decades. Unwittingly, he
belied his own statement that "no man can have . . . detailed knowledge
of the facts of many enterprises." 1x He had a remarkable ability to get
to the heart of a matter. And, perhaps most important of all, he had no
doubts once a decision had been made.
Perhaps too much has been said in this review about the subject of this
biography and too little about the biography itself. In a way, however, that
is the highest tribute that can be paid to Professor Mason's work. The book
makes Brandeis come alive as nothing previously written about him has
done. It conveys the quality of the man and the many fields in which that
quality was displayed. It tells the story of a life greatly lived, with enduring
lessons for every citizen and particularly for every lawyer. It should be
required reading for every law student.
Professor Mason has given us such a fine book that it seems ungracious to
add even a few minor notes of criticism. One does have the feeling, particu-
larly in the latter part of the book, that the adulatory note is a little too
strongly struck. Brandeis becomes a shade too virtuous, those with whom
he differed a shade too vicious. For example, it is hard to think of the Jus-
tice, even at the height of his disagreement with the brethren, referring to
the Supreme Court, as the author does, as "the citadel of corporate-financial
power." 2 To turn to a matter of a very different sort, why did Professor
Mason consign his wealth of interesting reference material to the end of the
volume, where they are made difficult of discovery even by the most diligent
reader? And this in a biography of the man who made the footnote live!
Professor Mason's purpose has been to sum up, in a scholarly and readable
form, the activities which made up, in the words of his subtitle, "A Free
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TOUCHED WITH FiRE. CIVIL WAR LETTERs AND DIARY OF OLIER WENDELL
HOLmES, JR. Edited by Mark De Wolfe Howe. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1946. Pp. 158. $3.00.
IF THIS letter-diary combination had been written by an officer named
Jones who, after 1865, went into the wool business and died obscurely in due
course of time, it would justifiably be hailed as a literary and historical find.
Having been written by Captain Holmes of the Twentieth Massachusetts,
who later attained other distinctions, it provides one of the best evening's
reading offered in a long time.
Holmes, J. had a flair for the dramatic, including dramatizing himself.1
He was articulate by right of inheritance. The Civil War was the most vivid
thing that ever happened to him and, in many deep and subtle ways, guided
the pattern of his thought and speech to his dying day. All of these qualities
and attitudes stand out in this book. Those of us who were his secretaries
heard much of the Civil War, and it is amazing how accurate the memory
was as checked against the impressions of the moment-the awful night of
pain and doubt among the other wounded after Ball's Bluff, the Message-
to-Garcia episode before Cold Harbor with condiments by Dumas p~re and
Tom Mix.
The.Captain and his mother went through these documents and threw
out a lot of them. From my days of trying cases I retain an inordinate curi-
osity as to suppressed documents. Why was Volume 1 of the Diary de-
stroyed, leaving only Volume 2 and some scraps of earlier pages? What was
wrong with the rest of the letters? Were they just dull? Did they give an
even worse drubbing to OWH's father than he receives in those published?
Were there passages (oh dear) which might have been distasteful to some of
the maidens of Beacon Street? Only one bit of evidence exists, a notation
in OWH's hand: "letter referred to within destroyed-rather pompous."
From this it is a fair inference that the excisions were designed to improve
the tone of the product-a process which a recent examination of my own
diaries of World War I indicates to be a wise precaution.2
This book is a record of daily events through which the Captain lived.
With one exception, it is not a record of thoughts on public issues or great
occurrences. Gettysburg is not mentioned, nor the Gettysburg Address.
1. In support of this proposition I need only cite the handlebars, wincing at the
thought that, had'he lived fifteen years longer, he would have been knoxn in the colyums
as "The Moustache."
2. These diaries also are in two volumes; and I also find Volume 1 painfully deficient
in social significance. If these are preserved in print for posterity I recommend the title,
"Thoughts on the World Aflame." The volume will naturally start with the diary entry for
the crucial date April 6, 1917 when the nation declared war in defense of democra y and
justice:
"April 6. Slept all morning. Went to lunch and a movie with Putnam in after-
noon. Called on Louise J. in the evening and cut my finger on one of her hairpins."
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There is no word of the Emancipation Proclamation and only a passing
reference to slavery.
The one venture into thinking on general issues presents a case history in
Psychological Warfare. At 3 A.M. on September 17, 1862, Captain Holmes
was bursting with confidence, pride and combative spirit, those priceless
ingredients of morale: "Hooker licked the Rebs nicely t'other day ...
We're in reserve and near him and may fight today. . . . Lick 'em if we
do." That very day he was wounded at Antietam. Here followed a series of
contacts with the enemy and enemy sympathizers in which they displayed
personal kindness plus a high belief in their own cause and a determination
to sustain it. The first contact was with a Confederate soldier who, moving
forward in a skirmish line in the midst of combat, stopped to give to wounded
Yankees his canteen full of water. Then Holmes spent some well-publicized
days of luxury and charm in Hagerstown, Maryland, which certainly was
not a hotbed of Union sentiment. Six weeks later Holmes and Lt. Abbott,
returning to duty, had trouble finding their regiment. The diary entry shows
the last contacts and the pay-off: "Nov. 19. A. and I walked over 20 miles
stopping occasionally at Secesh houses & finally put up at a good house with
a motherly old gal who advised us to go home and get stronger. The women
are freer in their expressions than the men and swear the South will stick it
out to the end-one of 'em had a brother shot in the face before Richmond.
... I've pretty much made up my mind that the South have achieved their
independence & I am almost ready to hope spring will see an end. . . .We
shall never lick 'em. . . . I think before long the majority will say that we
are vainly working to effect what never happens-the subjugation (for that
is it) of a great civilized nation." The net result was the temporary loss to
the Union of one ,Massachusetts captain. While awaiting comment on this
sequence from Anne Morrow Lindbergh and General Paulus, let us bestow
a round of applause on the Captain and his mother for not excising this bit
of bad prophecy.
At this particular time the publication of a soldier's diary from another
war inevitably raises the question: How different was it? To show the
startling contrasts it is worth while to list some Holmes quotations under
headings which describe well-recognized characteristics of the fighting men
of the war just finished:
Admiration and respect for officers of high rank. "With the crack brained
Dreher & obstinate ignoramus Shepherd as act'g Col & Lt Col the Regt is
going to H--L as fast as ever it can or at least no thanks to them if it isn't.
.. .Gen. Halleck (whom may the Lord confound). . . .Burnside is a d'd
humbug. Warren is a ditto." But N.B. nothing but praise for McClellan;
and obvious pride at having shaken the hands of Grant and Meade, though
the latter-snubbed him.
Generous recognition of virtues of other units. "What a joy it is to have
[Col. Hall in command of the Brigade] in place of, one who tells you his Regt
(not such a remarkable one except for a Penna Regt) has been in 42 battles
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& other unending blowing about himself, it, and the transcendent merits of
both. .. ."Objective viewpoint as to one's own unit. "I really very much doubt whether
there is any Regt wh. can compare with ours in the Army of the Poto-
mac .
Indifference to the plaudits of the throng. "I wish that while local Regts
like the 10th & 15th get cracked up like thunder that the 20th got its due
credit. . . . While we hear about the 10th &c &c & how the Tammany stood
like veterans (two miles out of the fight) our work is hardly mentioned.
After all it makes very little difference except for the sake of justice and one's
friends."
Affection for the fourth estate. "Page is a nasty toadying snob like most
correspondents... . D--n the N. Y. Herald."
Deference to the superior understanding of the home front. "Father'd better
not talk to me about opinions at home & here. On the staff one can form a
far better opinion of the particular campaign than one at home .... I wish
you'd take the trouble to read my letters before answering."
Appreciation of close support. "Our own side fired shell and canister into
us (hurt no one luckily)."
Meticulous adherence to security regulations. "Remember once for all that
all details like those I've written of our actual or probable movements are
strictly private as we are strongly forbidden to write about such things ...
Officers have reduced baggage to a very few portables-nobody knows, but
we may go on a naval expedition."
Single-hearted fidelit to the one true love. "Recd today also one from Fanny
McGregor, one from Fanny Dixwell & one from Ida Agassiz. . . Today's
mail-four letters and, even better, a toothbrush-3 were from blushing
maidens."
Practical devotion to the precepts of democracy. "Co. G although roughs
and poor material fought splendidly. . . . Shall I confess a frightful fact?
Many of the officers including your beloved son have discovered themselves
to have been attacked by body lice-caught perhaps from the men ...
I'm an out-and-outer of a democrat in theory, but for contact, except at the
polls, I loathe the thick-fingered clowns we call the people."
IV. BARTON LEACa"
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